

Cybersecurity

Integrating threat sharing into cyber defense

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30 Years of Information Assurance Different Areas of Focus, Same Model

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Reduce the Attack Surface

1980s



Focus on protecting operating systems
DoD 5200.28-STD

- Trusted computer base
- Least privilege

1990s



Focus on firewall technology

- Consolidate internet presence
- Proxy internet traffic
- Minimize ports & protocols

2000s



Focus on vulnerability assessments

- Know your network
- Find your vulnerabilities
- Patch management

Today



Focus on mitigation and compliance

- FISMA → Continuous Monitoring
- Consensus Audit Guidelines 'CAG 20'

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
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What We've Learned



Reducing attack surface really hard – maybe impossible

- Networks too large and complex
- Zero vulnerabilities for all assets on network?
 - Assumes you know all assets
 - Assumes you can know all vulnerabilities



Scanning and Patching Isn't Enough

- 0-day Exploits
 - Ave. patch time: 30 days
 - Ave. 0-days per year: 8
 - Exposure: 240 days per year
- Best-practice patching
 - 90% patched within 72 hours
 - Exposure : > 65% of the year





Traditional Approach

A traditional information assurance approach based solely on regulation, which resulted in an approach based on mitigation and compliance around static defenses

To a threat based cyber defense that balances Mitigation with Detection and Response

- Defenders become demanding consumers of intelligence
- Producers of intelligence

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
Characteristics of the Threat

1. We won't always see the initial attack
2. We can't keep the adversary out
3. Advanced Persistent Threat is not a "hacker"

Key Elements of Threat-Based Approach


1. Understanding of Threat Building Blocks
2. Effective Threat Sharing Model
3. Agile defensive posture aligned with threat

Cyber Attack Lifecycle A Model to Understand Cyber Threat Actions





Putting it Together : Layering Your Defense





Share Indicators and Tools, Not Outcomes



- Early attempts focused on vulnerabilities, intrusions, and attribution
- Organizations resisted sharing
 - Fear of embarrassment and liability
 - Classification constraints
- Attribution is overvalued
 - Not that important to response and mitigation
 - Can be relevant to understanding adversary TTPs

Evolve the Information Sharing Landscape Everyone Can Contribute

*From government-led,
top-down distribution*





To new constructs




Evolve the Information Sharing Landscape Everyone Can Contribute

*From government-led,
top-down distribution*



Supported By Standards-Based Infrastructure



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Sharing knowledge of our opponents and watching the plays develop, we can make the saves that protect our **networks**.

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BACK UP


Cyber Security Technical Capabilities

Technical Capability Areas



Focus Areas for Transformation Corporate Cyber Initiatives

To enhance our nation's cyber defense through the adoption of effective new concepts and enabling solutions



Cyber Security Capability Areas – One Level Deeper

